Deede DE-263 - History

Deede DE-263 - History

Deede

Leroy Clifford Deede, born 6 February 1916 in Woodworth, N.D., enlisted in the Naval Reserve 2 July 1937 he was appointed a Naval Aviator 21 September 1938. He was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross or his outstanding service while commanding a PBY during a bombing attack on a Japanese naval force in Jolo Harbor, Sulu, Philippine Islands, 27 December 1941. With his plane crippled after splashing an enemy plane which tried to down him Deede crash landed sea where he and his crew could be rescued. Lieutenant (junior grade) Deede was killed 17 June 1942 in the Asiatic area.

( DE-263: dp. 1,140; 1. 289'6"; b. 36'1"; dr. 8'3";
s. 21 k., cpl. 166, a. 3 3", 8 dcp., 1 dcp. (hh.), 2 dct.;
el. Evarts)

Deede (DE-263) was launched 6 April 1943 by Boston Navy Yard, sponsored by Mrs. M. B. Deede, mother of Lieutenant (junior grade) ,Deede, and commissioned 29 July 1943, Lieutenant Commander J. W. Whaley in command.

Deede arrived at Pearl Harbor 17 November 1943. She got underway 26 November for the invasion of the Gilberts, screened a convoy to Tarawa, then patrolled off Makin until 23 December when she returned to Pearl Harbor.

Deede arrived at Majuro 3 February 1944 for service as harbor pilot and patrol vessel during the occupation of that island. She returned to Pearl Harbor for training exercises from 21 February to 26 March, then escorted convoys between Majuro and Pearl Harbor until 26 May. She sailed from Pearl Harbor 4 June for Eniwetok, arriving 10 days later, and from this base escorted an oiler task unit which refueled TF 63 at sea on 20 June at the close of the Battle of the Philippine Sea, and TF 68 during the raid on the Bonins on 24 June.

Between 6 July and 1 September 1944 Deede served as screening and patrol ship during the assault and capture of the Marianas. After a brief overhaul at Eniwetok, she escorted Crater (AK-70) to Guadalcanal, then on 2 October joined the escort for a convoy to recently invaded Peleliu. She continued convoy duty aiding in the occupation of the Palaus until 17 November when she sailed for Pearl Harbor.

Deede served as escort and target in the training of submarines out of Pearl Harbor until 6 February 1945 when she got underway to escort a convoy of cargo and transport ships to reinforce the recent landings on Iwo Jima, arriving 23 February. She remained off Iwo Jima on patrol until 20 March when she screened the transports returning the 4th Marines to Pearl Harbor, arriving 4 April.

After overhaul at San Francisco and training at San Diego and Pearl Harbor, Deede joined the replenishment group for the 3d Fleet at Ulithi 21 July, operating with this group during the final air raids and bombardments on the Japanese mainland. She served as communications linking ship between Benevolence (AH-13) and Tranquillity (AH-14) from 16 to 21 August, then rejoined the logistics group to enter Tokyo Bay 2 October. Four days later she got underway for Pearl Harbor where she served with the Hawaiian Sea Frontier from 17 October to 19 November. Deede arrived at San Francisco 25 November and was decommissioned there 9 January 1946 and sold 12 June 1947.

Deede was awarded six battle stars for World War II service.


World War II Pacific operations

Deede arrived at Pearl Harbor on 17 November 1943. She got underway on 26 November for the invasion of the Gilberts, screened a convoy to Tarawa, then patrolled off Makin until 23 December when she returned to Pearl Harbor.

Deede arrived at Majuro on 3 February 1944 for service as harbor pilot and patrol vessel during the occupation of that island. She returned to Pearl Harbor for training exercises from 21 February to 26 March, then escorted convoys between Majuro and Pearl Harbor until 26 May. She sailed from Pearl Harbor on 4 June for Eniwetok, arriving ten days later, and from this base escorted an oiler task unit which refueled task force TF㺵 at sea on 20 June at the close of the Battle of the Philippine Sea, and TF㺺 during the raid on the Bonins on 24 June.

Between 6 July and 1 September 1944 Deede served as screening and patrol ship during the assault and capture of the Marianas. After a brief overhaul at Eniwetok, she escorted Crater (AK-70) to Guadalcanal, then on 2 October joined the escort for a convoy to recently invaded Peleliu. She continued convoy duty-aiding in the occupation of the Palaus until 17 November when she sailed for Pearl Harbor.


Mục lục

Những chiếc thuộc lớp tàu khu trục Evarts có chiều dài chung 289 ft 5 in (88,21 m), mạn tàu rộng 35 ft 1 in (10,69 m) và độ sâu mớn nước khi đầy tải là 8 ft 3 in (2,51 m). Chúng có trọng lượng choán nước tiêu chuẩn 1.140 tấn Anh (1.160 t) và lên đến 1.430 tấn Anh (1.450 t) khi đầy tải. Hệ thống động lực bao gồm bốn động cơ diesel General Motors Kiểu 16-278A nối với bốn máy phát điện để vận hành hai trục chân vịt công suất 6.000 hp (4.500 kW) cho phép đạt được tốc độ tối đa 21 kn (24 mph 39 km/h), và có dự trữ hành trình 4.150 nmi (4.780 dặm 7.690 km) khi di chuyển ở vận tốc đường trường 12 kn (14 mph 22 km/h). [1]

Vũ khí trang bị bao gồm ba pháo 3 in (76 mm)/50 cal trên tháp pháo nòng đơn có thể đối hạm hoặc phòng không, một khẩu đội 1,1 inch/75 caliber bốn nòng và chín pháo phòng không Oerlikon 20 mm. Vũ khí chống ngầm bao gồm một dàn súng cối chống tàu ngầm Hedgehog Mk. 10 (có 24 nòng và mang theo 144 quả đạn) hai đường ray Mk. 9 và tám máy phóng K3 Mk. 6 để thả mìn sâu. [1]

Deede được đặt lườn tại Xưởng hải quân Boston ở Boston, Massachusetts vào ngày 23 tháng 2, 1943. [1] Nó được hạ thủy vào ngày 6 tháng 4, 1943 được đỡ đầu bởi bà M. B. Deede, mẹ Trung úy Deede, và nhập biên chế vào ngày 29 tháng 7, 1943 dưới quyền chỉ huy của Hạm trưởng, Thiếu tá Hải quân J. W. Whaley. [2]

Sau khi hoàn tất việc chạy thử máy và huấn luyện, Deede được điều sang khu vực Mặt trận Thái Bình Dương, và đi đến Trân Châu Cảng vào ngày 17 tháng 11, 1943. Nó lên đường vào ngày 26 tháng 11 hộ tống cho các tàu chở dầu phục vụ cho các đội đặc nhiệm tham gia Chiến dịch Galvanic nhằm chiếm đóng quần đảo Gilbert, hộ tống một đoàn tàu vận tải đi đến đảo san hô Tarawa, rồi tuần tra ngoài khơi đảo Makin cho đến ngày 23 tháng 12, khi nó quay trở về Trân Châu Cảng. [2]

Đi đến Majuro vào ngày 3 tháng 2, 1944, Deede phục vụ tuần tra và kiểm soát lối ra vào vũng biển trong giai đoạn chiếm đóng đản này. Nó quay trở về Trân Châu Cảng để thực hành huấn luyện từ ngày 21 tháng 2 đến ngày 26 tháng 3, rồi lại lên đường hoạt động hộ tống vận tải tại khu vực giữa Majuro và Trân Châu Cảng cho đến ngày 26 tháng 5. Nó rờ Trân Châu Cảng vào ngày 4 tháng 6 để đi Eniwetok, đến nơi mười ngày sau đó, và từ căn cứ này hộ tống một đội tàu chở dầu làm nhiệm vụ tiếp nhiên liệu trên đường đi cho Lực lượng Đặc nhiệm 53 vào ngày 20 tháng 6, khi Trận chiến biển Philippine đi vào giai đoạn kết thúc, cũng như cho Lực lượng Đặc nhiệm 58 trong hoạt động không kích xuống quần đảo Bonin vào ngày 24 tháng 6. [2]

Từ ngày 6 tháng 7 đến ngày 1 tháng 9, Deede phục vụ như tàu bảo vệ và tuần tra trong quá trình tấn công để chiếm đóng quần đảo Mariana. Sau một lượt đại tu ngắn tại Eniwetok, nó hộ tống cho tàu chở hàng Crater (AK-70) đi Guadalcanal, rồi đến ngày 2 tháng 10 đã tham gia một đoàn tàu vận tải đi đến Peleliu. Con tàu tiếp tục hỗ trợ cho việc chiếm đóng quần đảo Palau cho đến ngày 17 tháng 11, khi nó lên đường quay trở về Trân Châu Cảng. [2]

Deede đã phục vụ hộ tống vận tải tại chỗ và như mục tiêu huấn luyện tàu ngầm tại khu vực quần đảo Hawaii cho đến ngày 6 tháng 2, 1945. Nó lên đường hộ tống một đoàn tàu chở hàng và tàu vận chuyển để tăng viện cho cuộc đổ bộ tại Iwo Jima, đến nơi vào ngày 23 tháng 2. Con tàu tiếp tục tuần tra ngoài khơi hòn đảo này cho đến ngày 20 tháng 3, khi nó lên đường hộ tống các tàu chở quân đưa Sư đoàn 4 Thủy quân Lục chiến quay trở về Trân Châu Cảng, đến nơi vào ngày 4 tháng 4. [2]

Sau khi được đại tu tại San Francisco và huấn luyện ôn tập tại San Diego và Trân Châu Cảng, Deede tham gia đội tiếp liệu cho Đệ Tam hạm đội tại Ulithi vào ngày 21 tháng 7, hỗ trợ cho Lực lượng Đặc nhiệm 38 trong các chiến dịch không kích sau cùng xuống các đảo chính quốc Nhật Bản. Nó đã phục vụ như tàu liên lạc giữa các tàu bệnh viện Benevolence (AH-13) và Tranquility (AH-14) từ ngày 16 đến ngày 21 tháng 8, rồi tham gia đội tiếp liệu tiến vào vịnh Tokyo vào ngày 2 tháng 10. Con tàu lên đường quay trở lại Trân Châu Cảng bốn ngày sau đó, nơi nó phục vụ dưới quyền Tư lệnh Tiền phương Biển Hawaii từ ngày 17 tháng 10 đến ngày 19 tháng 11. [2]

Deede quay trở về San Francisco vào ngày 25 tháng 11, 1945. Nó được cho xuất biên chế tại đây vào ngày 9 tháng 1, 1946 và bị bán để tháo dỡ vào ngày 12 tháng 6, 1947. [2]


LeRoy Clifford Deede, LT - Military Timeline

Distinguished Flying Cross: "For extraordinary flying achievement while commanding a PBY type airplane which delivered a bombing attack on a Japanese Naval force in Jolo Harbor, Sulu, P.I. on 27 December 1941, and while under continuous antiaircraft fire which crippled your plane and opposed by enemy fighters, you successfully evaded the enemy and landed your plane at sea from which you and the members of your crew were rescued by another PBY type further successfully shooting down an enemy fighter which attacked you". The medal was posthumously awarded to his mother on 17 July 1942 by then Governor John Moses.

LeRoy Clifford Deede (born 5 February 1916 in Woodworth, North Dakota) was a United States Naval Reserve officer.

Deede enlisted in th. LeRoy Clifford Deede
WWII Naval Aviator - Distinguished Flying Cross

LeRoy Clifford Deede (born 5 February 1916 in Woodworth, North Dakota) was a United States Naval Reserve officer.

LeRoy Clifford Deede (born 5 February 1916 in Woodworth, North Dakota) was a United States Naval Reserve officer.

Deede enlisted in th. LeRoy Clifford Deede
WWII Naval Aviator - Distinguished Flying Cross

LeRoy Clifford Deede (born 5 February 1916 in Woodworth, North Dakota) was a United States Naval Reserve officer.


Deede DE-263 - History

Between 6 July and 1 September 1944 Deede served as screening and patrol ship during the assault and capture of the Marianas. After a brief overhaul at Eniwetok, she escorted to Guadalcanal, then on 2 October joined the escort for a convoy to recently invaded Peleliu. She continued convoy duty-aiding in the occupation of the Palaus until 17 November when she sailed for Pearl Harbor.

Deede enlisted in the Naval Reserve on 2 July 1937 and was appointed a Naval Aviator 21 September 1938. He was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross for his outstanding service while commanding a PBY during a bombing attack on a Japanese naval force in Jolo Harbor, Sulu, Philippines, 27 December 1941. With his plane crippled after destroying an enemy plane which tried to down him, Deede crash landed at sea where he and his crew could be rescued. Lieutenant (junior grade) Deede was killed 17 June 1942 in the Asiatic area.

Deede arrived at San Francisco on 25 November, was decommissioned there on 9 January 1946, and sold on 12 June 1947.

Deede arrived at Majuro on 3 February 1944 for service as harbor pilot and patrol vessel during the occupation of that island. She returned to Pearl Harbor for training exercises from 21 February to 26 March, then escorted convoys between Majuro and Pearl Harbor until 26 May. She sailed from Pearl Harbor on 4 June for Eniwetok, arriving ten days later, and from this base escorted an oiler task unit which refueled task force TF 53 at sea on 20 June at the close of the Battle of the Philippine Sea, and TF 58 during the raid on the Bonins on 24 June.

Deede was awarded six battle stars for World War II service.

Deede or variant, may refer to:

Deede was launched 6 April 1943 by Boston Navy Yard sponsored by Mrs. M. B. Deede, mother of Lieutenant (junior grade) Deede and commissioned 29 July 1943, Lieutenant Commander J. W. Whaley in command.

The USS Deede (DE-263) was named in his honor.

USS Deede (DE-263) was an in the United States Navy. The ship was named after LeRoy Clifford Deede, LTJG, USNR.

Deede arrived at Pearl Harbor on 17 November 1943. She got underway on 26 November for the invasion of the Gilberts, screened a convoy to Tarawa, then patrolled off Makin until 23 December when she returned to Pearl Harbor.

Deede served as escort and target in the training of submarines out of Pearl Harbor until 6 February 1945 when she got underway to escort a convoy of cargo and transport ships to reinforce the recent landings on Iwo Jima, arriving on 23 February. She remained off Iwo Jima on patrol until 20 March when she screened the transports returning the 4th Marines to Pearl Harbor, arriving on 4 April.

After overhaul at San Francisco and training at San Diego and Pearl Harbor, Deede joined the replenishment group for the 3rd Fleet at Ulithi on 21 July, operating with this group during the final air raids and bombardments on the Japanese mainland. She served as communications linking ship between hospital ships and from 16 to 21 August, then rejoined the logistics group to enter Tokyo Bay on 2 October. Four days later she got underway for Pearl Harbor where she served with the Hawaiian Sea Frontier from 17 October to 19 November.

LeRoy Clifford Deede (born 5 February 1916 in Woodworth, North Dakota) was a United States Naval Reserve officer.

Not to be confused with the (Lower) Angara River. The Upper Angara River (Верхняя Ангара, Verkhnyaya Angara, Deede Angar) is a river in Siberia to the north of Lake Baikal. It is 320 km long and rises north-east of Lake Baikal, flowing south-west through the Buryat Republic and eventually into the lake. It is partly navigable. The Baikal Amur Mainline runs along the north side of the river northeast up its valley, crossing between Anamakit and Novy Uoyan and crossing the river a second time upstream before heading into the mountains.

One of the first references to the 'Setter,' or setting dog, in literature can be found in Caius's De Canibus Britannicus, which was published in 1570 (with a revised version published in 1576). Translated from the original Latin, the text reads: "The Dogge called the Setter, in Latine, Index: Another sort of Dogges be there, serviceable for fowling, making no noise either with foote or with tongue, whiles they follow the game. They attend diligently upon their Master and frame their condition to such beckes, motions and gestures, as it shall please him to exhibite and make, either going forward, drawing backeward, inclinding to the right hand, or yealding toward the left. When he hath founde the byrde, he keepeth sure and fast silence, he stayeth his steppes and will proceed no further, and weth a close, covert watching eye, layeth his belly to the grounde and so creepth forward like a worme. When he approaches neere to the place where the byrde is, he layes him downe, and with a marcke of his pawes, betrayeth the place of the byrdes last abode, whereby it is supposed that this kind of dogge is calles in Index, Setter, being in deede a name most consonant and agreeable to his quality.""

Caius went on to describe the dog called a setter using the Latin name index: "Another sort of Dogges be there, serviceable for fowling, making no noise either with foote or with tongue, whiles they follow the game. They attend diligently upon their Master and frame their condition to such beckes, motions and gestures, as it shall please him to exhibite and make, either going forward, drawing backeward, inclinding to the right hand, or yealding toward the left. When he hath founde the byrde, he keepeth sure and fast silence, he stayeth his steppes and wil proceede no further, and weth a close, covert watching eye, layeth his belly to the grounde and so creepth forward like a worme. When he approaches neere to the place where the byrde is, he layes him downe, and with a marcke of his pawes, betrayeth the place of the byrdes last abode, whereby it is supposed that this kind of dogge is calles in Index, Setter, being in deede a name most consonant and agreeable to his quality."

In 2011, Rheagan played Deede Wallrath, the daughter of Texas agricultural tycoon Richard "Dick" Wallrath (portrayed by Jon Gries) in the film Deep in the Heart (which premiered at the Austin Film Festival on October 23, 2011).

While attending Marquette University in Milwaukee in the 1990s, Richard Jankovich formed Big Mother Gig with Rob Due, Jason Borkowicz and Charles Watson. In 1993, they released "My Social Commentary." In 1994, Rob Due was replaced by Riz Rashid and they released "Transition EP." Borkowicz and Watson left in 1995 and we're ultimately replaced by Brady Roehl (drums) and Matt Deede (bass.) In 1996, Big Mother Gig released "Smiling Politely" and broke up when Jankovich moved to New York City. From 1992 to 1996, Big Mother Gig played over 150 concerts around the Midwest. Other prior members include Joe Neumann and Brian Rutkowski.

In 2012, following the reconfiguration of the state's legislative districts and following the resignation of Representative Richard L. Steinberg in a harassing text-messages scandal, an open seat was created in the 113th District. Richardson opted to run, and faced Mark Weithorn, the husband of Miami Beach City Commissioner Deede Weithorn Adam Kravitz, the founder of JDate and Waldo Faura in the Democratic primary. He received 33% of the vote to Weithorn's 26%, Kravitz's 24%, and Faura's 16%, advancing to the general election, where he was elected unopposed. His victory in the general election, along with the victory of Joe Saunders that same year, allowed both Richardson and Saunders to be the first openly gay members of the state legislature.

The scent of game birds is airborne so to pick up this scent the setter carries its head well up and should never follow foot scent. Most setters are born with a natural proclivity to hunting. Dogs that show excitement and interest in birds are described as being "birdy", and trainers look for puppies that show this particular trait. Training is usually done with quail as a first choice or domesticated pigeons.


Photos WW2 US Forces

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During her fourth patrol, Borie got a radar contact on U-256 shortly after 1943 hours, 31 October and closed in. The U-boat promptly crash dived. Two depth charge attacks forced her back to the surface, but she again submerged after a third attack, a large oil slick was observed. Though U-256 made it home badly damaged, Hutchins believed the target to be sunk, and signalled Card: "Scratch one pig boat am searching for more."

Borie then got another radar contact about 26 miles (42 km) from the first, at 0153 hours on 1 November 1943, range 8,000 yards (7,300 m) and charged in to engage. At 2,800 yards (2,600 m) radar contact was lost, but sonar picked up the enemy sub at about the same time. Borie engaged U-405 (a Type VIIC U-boat) hours before dawn, at 49°00' N., 31°14' W. There were 15-foot (4.6 m) seas, with high winds and poor visibility. The destroyer initially launched depth charges, after which the submarine came (or was probably forced) to the surface. Borie then came about for another attack, engaging with 4-inch and 20 mm gunfire at a range of 400 yards (370 m).

The sub's machine guns scored hits in the forward engine room and several scattered and harmless hits near the bridge, and her deck gun crew traversed their 88 mm (3.5 in) gun and took aim for their first shot at Borie's waterline but Borie's 20 mm gunfire killed every exposed member of the sub's crew topside, and a salvo of three 4-inch shells then blew off the sub's deck gun before it fired a round. Borie then closed in and rammed U-405, but at the last moment, the submarine turned hard to port and a huge wave lifted the Borie's bow onto the foredeck of the U-boat.

After the ramming, Borie was high-centered on top of U-405, and until they separated, exchanges of small arms fire took place. This was a unique battle: unlike most other modern naval battles, it was decided by ramming and small arms fire at extremely close range. Borie's 24-inch spotlight kept the submarine illuminated throughout the following battle, except for brief periods when it was turned off for tactical reasons.

The two ships were initially almost perpendicular to one another as the battle progressed, wave action and the efforts of both crews to dislodge from the enemy ship resulted in the two vessels becoming locked in a "V" for an extended fight, with the U-boat along Borie's port side. The two ships were locked together only 25–30° from parallel. The action of the seas began to open seams in Borie's hull forward and flood her forward engine room. The submarine's hull, made of thicker steel and sturdier beams to withstand deep diving, was better able to handle the stress. Hutchins reported later, "We were impressed by the ruggedness and toughness of these boats."

Normally, in a surface engagement the superior armament, speed and reserve buoyancy of the destroyer would have been decisive. But in this unusual case, the destroyer was unable to depress her 4-inch and 3-inch deck guns enough to hit the sub, while all of the submarine's machine guns could be brought to bear. One or two 4-inch gun crews attempted to fire, but their shells passed harmlessly over the target. Borie's crew had a limited number of small arms, however, and the German deck mounts were completely open and had no protection. The executive officer had presented a virtually identical situation during drills on 27 October — a theoretical ramming by a U-boat on the port side — and as a result, after the ramming the Borie's crew took immediate action without orders.

In the extended and bitter fighting that ensued, dozens of German sailors were killed in desperate attempts to keep their machine guns manned. As each man emerged from the hatch and ran toward the guns, he was illuminated by Borie's spotlight and met by a hail of gunfire. Borie's resourceful crew engaged the enemy with whatever was at hand: Tommy guns, rifles, pistols, shotguns intended for riot control, and even a Very pistol. Borie's executive officer and a signalman fired effectively from the bridge with Tommy guns throughout the fight. One German sailor was hit in the chest with a Very flare. One of the Oerlikon 20 mm cannon was also able to continue firing, with devastating effect.

Borie's crewmen could clearly see a polar bear insignia painted on the conning tower of the sub, and three numerals that had been obliterated by 20 mm gunfire. The bow of the sub had been badly damaged by the depth charges and she was probably unable to submerge. U-405's deck armament was extensive: in addition to the 88 mm gun, she also had six MG 42 machine guns, in one quadruple and two single mounts. These weapons would have been devastating if the sub's crewmen had been able to keep them manned. Occasionally, one of them would reach one of the MG 42 mounts, and open fire briefly before he was killed. Other German sailors kept up a sporadic small arms fire of their own from open hatchways.

At a key moment in the fight, as Borie's port side crewmen were running out of 20 mm and small arms ammunition, two Germans broke from their protected position behind the bridge and approached the quad mount gun. A thrown sheath knife pierced a German crewman's abdomen and he fell overboard. Unable to bring his gun to bear, one of the 4-inch gun captains threw an empty 4-inch shell casing at the other German sailor, and successfully knocked him overboard as well.

Finally, U-405 and Borie separated and the crews attempted to engage each other with torpedoes, to no effect. At this point, about 35 of the German crew of 49 had been killed or lost overboard. Borie had been badly damaged and was moving at a reduced speed, while the sub was still capable of maneuvering at a similar speed. U-405's tighter turning radius effectively prevented Borie from bringing her superior broadside firepower to bear, and her skipper, Korvettenkapitän Rolf-Heinrich Hopmann, did a masterful job of maneuvering his badly damaged boat with his remaining crew.

Borie shut off her searchlight, with her crew hoping U-405 would attempt to escape and provide a better target for gunfire. The submarine did attempt to speed away, and Borie switched her searchlight back on and turned to bring her broadside guns and a depth charge thrower to bear. The sub was bracketed by shallow-set depth charges and struck by a 4-inch shell, and came to a stop. Borie's crew observed about 14 sailors signalling their surrender and abandoning ship in yellow rubber rafts, and Hutchins gave the order to cease fire several of them were apparently wounded, being loaded into the rafts in stretchers by their shipmates. The last man to leave the stricken ship was wearing an officer's cap. U-405 sank slowly by the stern at 0257. She was seen to explode underwater, probably from scuttling charges set by the last officer to leave. Hutchins reported later,

The survivors were observed firing Very star shells: Borie's crew believed this to be a distress signal, and maneuvered in an attempt to recover them from their rubber rafts, as they approached 50–60 yards (46–55 m) off the port bow. But as it turned out, the Germans were signalling another surfaced U-boat, which answered with a star shell of her own. A Borie lookout reported a torpedo passing close by from that U-boat, and Borie had no choice but to protect herself by sailing away. Borie was forced to sail through the U-405 survivors' rafts as she turned away from the other U-boat, but the men on the rafts were observed firing another Very flare as Borie steamed away in a radical zigzag pattern. No German survivors were ever recovered by either side all 49 crewmen were lost.

A jubilant radio report of the sinking of U-405 was sent to Card after the engagement, before the extent of the ship's damage was fully realized. Then her radio fell silent. Borie attempted to reach her scheduled rendezvous with the rest of the Card Task Group, planned for shortly after sunrise.

Because of the loss of electric power, the crew had to wait until daylight to fully assess the damage to their ship. First light brought a thick fog. Borie was too badly damaged by the collision to reach the rendezvous in time, or even be towed to port by her sister ships. She had sustained severe underwater damage along her entire port side, including both engine rooms, as the two ships were pounded together by the sea before separating. The stress of the wave action from the 15-foot waves, as Borie was pinned against the U-boat's hull, had caused damage to key operating systems throughout the ship.

The forward engine room and generators were completely flooded, and only the starboard engine was operating in the partially flooded aft engine room. Auxiliary power had been lost and speed was reduced. The most critical damage was the compromised hull but steam and water lines had separated, and most of the fresh water for the boilers had been lost, compounding the drive system problems. As a result, Hutchins was forced to use salt water in the boilers: the reduction in steam pressure forcing him to further reduce speed to 10 knots, making her an easy target for U-boats.

At about 1100, the communications officer restarted the Kohler emergency radio generator with a mixture of Zippo lighter fluid and alcohol from a torpedo a distress call was sent, a homing beacon was set up and, after some delays due to poor visibility, Borie was spotted by a Grumman TBF Avenger from Card. Valiant efforts were made to save the ship. Kerosene battle lanterns had to be used for all work below decks. The crew formed a bucket brigade, and all available topweight was jettisoned, even the gun director. All remaining torpedoes were fired. The lifeboat, torpedo tubes, 20 mm guns and machine guns were removed and thrown over the side, along with the small arms used against the U-boat crew, tons of tools and equipment, and over 100 mattresses. Only enough 4-inch ammunition was kept for a final defensive action: 10 rounds per gun.

But the ship continued to slowly settle into the water with all pumps running trailing fuel oil from all portside fuel tanks, and an approaching storm front had been reported. It would have been necessary to bring out a tugboat to tow her into port due to the poor visibility prevalent in the North Atlantic, Hutchins believed the chances of a tugboat finding Borie were slim. The nearest port, Horta, was about 690 miles away Iceland, Ireland and Newfoundland were all about 900 miles away, and the task group was at the approximate center of five reported U-boat wolfpacks. By now there were 20-foot (6.1 m) waves.

As nightfall approached at 1630, Hutchins reluctantly ordered his exhausted crew to abandon ship. The Card task force had taken a substantial risk by leaving the escort carrier unprotected in sub-infested waters. Card was 10 miles away, but Goff and Barry were close by as the crew abandoned Borie on orders from the Task Group commander, the ship was not scuttled at that time. Despite the sporadic machine gun and small arms fire from U-405, none of Borie's crewmen had been killed during the engagement, although several were wounded. But due to 44 °F (7 °C) water, 20-foot waves, high winds and severe exhaustion, three officers and 24 enlisted men were lost during the rescue operation. Hutchins reported, "Many of the lost were just unable to get over the side" of the two rescuing destroyers.

Still, the ship remained afloat through the night Goff and Barry attempted to sink the wreck at first light, but torpedoes went astray in the heavy seas. One 4-inch shell from Barry struck the bridge and started a small fire, but she still refused to sink. The coup de grace was delivered on the morning of 2 November by a 500 lb (227 kg) bomb dropped by a TBF Avenger from VC-9 on Card. Borie finally sank at 0955 on 2 November. The survivors were transferred to the more spacious accommodations of Card for the journey home.

Smoking badly from internal fires, listing badly and down by the stern, the gallant old four-stacker destroyer, USS Borie, is shown just before she was sunk by torpedo bombers from the escort aircraft carrier USS Card

USS Borie (DD-215) being bombed by aircraft from the escort carrier USS Card (CVE-13),


Second Tier

Emil Augsburg: The name file of Emil Augsburg (alias Althaus, alias Alberti) reveals interesting details concerning intelligence cooperation between the U.S. and West German intelligence communities. Born in Lodz, Poland in 1904, Emil Augsburg obtained his doctorate in 1934 with a dissertation on the Soviet press. Fluent in Polish and Russian, he joined the SD the same year and began to make his way up the SS ranks, reaching major (Sturmbannfuehrer) in 1944. In 1937 he joined the Wannsee Institute, which performed ideologically-based research on Eastern Europe. He soon became a departmental director. In 1939-40 and again in the summer and fall of 1941 he joined the Security Police to carry out what were called "special duties (spezielle Aufgaben), a euphemism for executions of Jews and others the Nazis considered undesirable. Wounded in an air attack in Smolensk in September 1941, he returned in 1942 to Berlin for research on Eastern European matters. The RSHA foreign intelligence branch formally absorbed the Wannsee Institute in 1943. All this information, gleaned from Augsburg's SS file, was available to the CIA and was in Augsburg's file.

In a document not found in the Augsburg name file, a Nazi official named Mahnke stated that the Wannsee Institute exploited documents captured by German forces in the Soviet Union. It produced strictly secret intelligence reports on Russia for a select clientele of high Nazi officials, including Heinrich Himmler and Hermann Goering. Augsburg was described as the intellectual leader of this institute.

Despite being wanted by Poland for war crimes, Augsburg was used by CIC from 1947 to 1948 as an expert on Soviet affairs, thanks in part to his insistence that at the end of the war he had cashiered eight trunks of files about Comintern activities (these were never found). Augsburg was dropped as a CIC informant, perhaps the result of a negative appraisal by Klaus Barbie, who also worked for CIC. Barbie passed on word to CIC that Augsburg's brother was part of a network of former SS officials with connections to the French.

Even before then Augsburg was picked up by the Gehlen organization, thanks mainly to his contacts within the anti-Communist émigré community and his ability to recruit agents from this group. By 1953 the Gehlen organization viewed Augsburg as a "shining star" in counterespionage and counterintelligence work: in 1959 one official referred to him as "a godsend." Still, Gehlen himself insisted as late as 1954 that Augsburg work outside of the organization's headquarters at Pullach because of Augsburg's SS past and service in the RSHA, which made him vulnerable to Soviet coercion. As early as 1955 there were reports that the Soviets indeed were trying to contact him. In 1961 Augsburg came under renewed suspicion in the midst of the scandal over Heinz Felfe. In 1964-65 some of Augsburg's eastern European contacts were exposed as suspected war criminals and as Soviet spies. In late 1965 the BND concluded that Augsburg too could be a double agent. Augsburg's SS file was reviewed in 1964 with the hope that enough derogatory information about his Nazi past could be found to induce his voluntary resignation from the BND, but in the end, unauthorized intelligence activity led to his dismissal in 1966.

Eugen Dollmann: One recurring issue in the name file on Eugen Dollmann was how much American goodwill Dollmann earned by taking part in secret negotiations involving Allen Dulles and Karl Wolff to bring about the surrender of German forces in northern Italy just before the end of the war in Europe.

Born in 1900, Dollmann, trained as an archeologist, became Himmler's personal representative to the Italian government and the Vatican during the war he operated out of the German Embassy in Rome. In August 1946 Dollmann and Karl Wolff's former adjutant Eugen Wenner escaped from an Allied POW camp. Italian intelligence and Cardinal Idlefonso Schuster (archbishop of Milan and an active supporter of Mussolini's Fascist regime) reportedly intended to use both men, whom they stashed in an insane asylum in Milan, to help Schuster claim credit for arranging the German surrender in Italy and preventing a German scorched-earth policy there. This account was at variance with the facts-Schuster was not involved in the secret Dulles-Wolff negotiations. Central Intelligence Group (soon to become CIA) official James Angleton described this false account as an Italian right-wing political maneuver, with Vatican support, to stir up anti-Allied feeling in Italy. Italian intelligence gave Dollmann and Wenner false identity cards.

Through connections with the Italian police, in late 1946 Angleton secretly managed to get Dollmann and Wenner back into American hands. Complications arose, however, after Dollmann was named as a suspect or witness for an Italian trial regarding the March 1944 German massacre of Italians as retaliation for Italian partisan activity in Rome. The victims were buried in the Ardeatine Caves.

Baron Luigi Parrilli, an Italian intermediary in the Dulles-Wolff negotiations (see listing on Zimmer below), claimed that the two men had been promised immunity. Angleton and other American officials argued that, though there had been no promise from American authorities, the two Germans had helped the U. S., and in any case Dollmann had had no part in the Ardeatine Cave massacre. It would only serve to undermine Allied strength in Italy and damage the long-term capacity of American intelligence there to turn Dollmann and Wenner back to the Italian government. Other agents in Italy would not trust the Americans.

American authorities sent the two men to the American zone of Germany in mid-1947. The hope was that, despite all mishaps, they would be grateful to the U.S. for their escape, and they might serve as intelligence assets in the future. They were warned against going back to Italy, where they might be tried as war criminals, and where their capture might seriously embarrass American authorities. Dollmann and Wenner, however, also faced prosecution in denazification proceedings in the American zone of Germany, and they had no resources or jobs there. They decided to return to Italy. American army officers smuggled them through the Brenner Pass in early 1948, and Dollmann reportedly began to work as an agent for CIC in Italy. Simultaneously, he began to write and to sell his memoirs, which were serialized in the Italian press in 1949.

By 1950, Dollmann, in financial difficulty, was peddling reports to Italian intelligence, partly about surviving SS officers with secret arms caches, but partly also about his knowledge of American intelligence. In 1951 Dollmann reportedly held an Italian passport under the name of Eugenio Amonn, was living in Lugano, Switzerland, where he had recruited two German nuclear physicists for the Italian navy. He also claimed to be able to produce previously unknown correspondence between Hitler and other European politicians, which he would sell. A West German report in January 1952 claimed that Dollmann had been in Egypt during the previous year and was in contact with Haj-Amin el-Husseini, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, and former Nazi Gauleiter Hartmann Lauterbacher.

In February 1952 Dollmann was expelled from Switzerland. By one report, his ouster came after he entered into a homosexual relationship with a Swiss police official. He went secretly to Italy, hid temporarily in a monastery, and was taken by a Father Parini to Spain. Otto Skorzeny, famous for his liberation of Mussolini in September 1943, had established an intelligence network in Franco's Spain and took Dollmann under his wing. A 1952 CIA report on Germans in Spain described Dollmann as infamous for his blackmail, subterfuge, and double-dealing.

Franz Goering: The name file on Franz Goering consists of very limited information about Goering's work during World War II as an aide to Walter Schellenberg, head of the Foreign Intelligence branch of the RSHA, and more information about Goering's mishaps in 1959 as a BND official.

Born in 1908, Goering made a career in the Criminal Police, then switched to the Security Police. In 1944 Schellenberg took him on as an assistant, partly on the recommendation of his secretary, with whom Goering was having an affair. At first, Goering's main duty was to look after important guests, such as Swiss politician Jean Marie Musy. Toward the end of the war Schellenberg used Goering in negotiations designed to release groups of inmates from concentration camps in northern Germany behind Hitler's back-though there is no information about these activities in the CIA name file. Goering also allegedly took valuables to Sweden for Schellenberg.

By 1959 Goering was a BND official. One of his former colleagues showed up to see him in Hamburg: the two men went out drinking, and Goering invited the man to spend the night. In the morning the guest was gone, and so were some records on intelligence operations which Goering had kept at his home. The guest was a Soviet agent, and he left a note inviting Goering to defect.

Wilhelm Harster: The name file on Wilhelm Harster consists partly of copies of his SS personnel file and partly of evidence that he sought to play an intelligence role during the late 1950s and early 1960s.

A lieutenant general in the SS and Commander of the Security Police and SD first in the Netherlands and then in Italy, Harster was directly connected with the Holocaust in two countries. According to a notation in the file, Harster was implicated in the murder of 104,000 Jews. He also played a marginal role in the early surrender of German forces in northern Italy, an event discussed below (see entry on Zimmer). In 1947 a Dutch court sentenced Harster to twelve years in prison, but he was released in 1950. He managed to gain a position in the Bavarian government, but was fired after his World War II career received media attention.

Although unable to join the BND himself, because he was considered a security risk, Harster passed himself off as a BND agent in dealing with others, and he recommended many of his SS contacts to the BND as potential agents. Harster had been the superior of Heinz Felfe, a BND official who was also a Soviet agent, and Harster apparently used Felfe to reach the BND.

Wilhelm Hoettl: The name file on Wilhelm Hoettl is a huge file covering wartime events, his immediate postwar activities, and espionage in the early 1950s. Only some of the highlights are discussed here: a more detailed report on Hoettl is available separately.

Born in Vienna on March 19, 1915, Hoettl managed to rise quickly in the ranks of the SD, becoming a specialist on southeastern Europe. He had good ties with fellow Austrian Ernst Kaltenbrunner, the last chief of the RSHA. He was involved in the maneuvers to recover the diaries of former Italian Foreign Minister, and he served as political advisor to Edmund Veesenmayer, German plenipotentiary in Hungary during 1944.

Toward the end of the war Hoettl managed through an intermediary to contact OSS in Switzerland. Despite the fact that OSS officials considered Hoettl dangerous, they believed he had useful information. First the OSS and then the U. S. Army CIC reportedly began to use Hoettl to ferret out remaining Nazi agents. Then Hoettl testified at the Nuremberg trials-for the defense-and worked for CIC. He also drew on unknown resources, possibly plundered Jewish assets which Kaltenbrunner had turned over to him, to set himself up nicely in postwar Austria, where he peddled intelligence to various customers, including the Gehlen organization. Simultaneously, he began to write books under a pseudonym about Nazi espionage. He was in frequent contact with Wilhelm Krichbaum (see Krichbaum listing below), and he was, like Krichbaum, suspected of working for Soviet intelligence. He was arrested, but was never prosecuted. He died in 1999.

Michel Kedia: The name file on Michel Kedia traces the complicated movements and conflicting loyalties of a Georgian involved with activities directed against the Soviet Union from the 1920s to the 1950s. Kedia, a member of the Georgian National Committee, emigrated early from his native land to France and took up cooperation with German intelligence during World War II. In 1942-43, as chief of the Georgian desk for the RSHA's Operation Zeppelin, he recruited POWs from the Caucasus and others in his Georgian organization for German parachute operations into the Caucasus. In 1943 he also made trips to Turkey to organize uprisings in the Turkish and Caucasian frontier regions. In mid-1944, as the defeat of Germany became increasingly likely, Kedia tried to contact the Allies to offer his services. He claimed to have saved the lives of some Jews in France.

Kedia contacted the OSS through Yuri Skarzhinski (YOURI), a White Russian who had fled Germany for France with his help. Later, after escaping to Geneva in the last months of the war, Kedia again offered his help to the United States. Despite Kedia's keen interest in working for U.S. intelligence, the OSS and later the CIA rebuffed his offers. One CIA report described him as a man "with a long bad record." It was alleged that by January 1946 Kedia had strong ties to Soviet intelligence, and the CIA later mounted an operation to "smoke out" his contacts.

Not all U.S. agencies viewed Kedia warily. Until December 1948 Kedia allegedly served as an informant for the CIC, although the CIA file does not disclose how active he was.

Horst Kopkow: The name file on Horst Kopkow, head of the Gestapo's section on sabotage and a leading expert on Communist espionage against Germany, contains documents from the immediate postwar period only, when he was in British hands. Kopkow went into hiding at the end of the war, but was betrayed by another Gestapo official and captured by the British. British intelligence interrogated Kopkow at length on Soviet espionage and sabotage methods, and Kopkow was very forthcoming with information about these and about German methods of combating the now famous Communist "Red Orchestra" spy network. The highlight of the file is a sixty-page British interrogation, a copy handed over to the Americans. (This interrogation, to the best of our knowledge, is not available elsewhere in the United States National Archives. It may or may not be available at the Public Record Office in the United Kingdom.)

Kopkow offered exact details of how Nazi officials eventually penetrated the Red Orchestra, turned a number of arrested Communist agents, and fed information back to Moscow. Kopkow also related that he had learned from another Gestapo official that Heinrich Himmler had given a long speech to some 15-18 high officials of the SS and police at police headquarters in Flensburg in the closing days of the war. Himmler still hoped that the Allies would leave a small preserve in the area north of the Kiel Canal to be controlled by a German government. Himmler concluded that the hammer now had to replace the sword: everyone had to devote himself or herself to rebuilding railways and industries. The police had to fade into the background or disappear, Himmler said. Information about this speech does not appear in biographies of Himmler.

There is no indication in this file whether Kopkow took part in postwar intelligence work for any intelligence agency. The fact that the CIA maintained a file on him, however, suggests either that he was of intelligence interest or that the information he previously gave was considered still of interest. According to a statement given by another Gestapo official who knew Kopkow (a statement not contained in this file), British intelligence hid Kopkow and then used him. There are separate indications that Kopkow surfaced later as an official in the Gehlen organization.

Wilfried Krallert: The name file on Wilfried Krallert is a small one, consisting partly of barely legible copies of Krallert's SS personnel file, which has been available elsewhere (Berlin Document Center) for many years. Born in 1912, Krallert studied history and geography at the University of Vienna and became involved in the Austrian Nazi Party. In his capacity as historian, he was invited to attend the planned Nazi assassination of Austrian Chancellor Dollfuss, but through a slip-up, he missed out on the event. A cartographer and ethnographic expert on southeast Europe, he worked for the Foreign Intelligence Branch (Amt VI) of the RSHA and headed the Austrian Wannsee Institute. As Amt VIG Gruppenleiter, he also served as secretary of the so-called Kuratorium (III/VI), which coordinated domestic and foreign intelligence research. At the end of the war he was arrested and interned by the British, who interrogated him and eventually released him in 1948.

There were reports that French intelligence used him thereafter, and the Gehlen organization picked him up in 1952. Then he may have been associated with the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, the West German equivalent of the FBI. Documents in 1963-64 indicate some CIA concern about Krallert's wartime activities (and presumably his susceptibility to Soviet pressure), but the file ends on an inconclusive note.

Wilhelm Krichbaum: The name file on Wilhelm Krichbaum, former head of the Counter Intelligence Police of the Wehrmacht (Geheime Feldpolizei) in Nazi Germany and a district chief within the Gehlen organization, contains mostly documents (from the early 1950s) connecting Krichbaum with Curt Ponger and Otto Verber. Ponger and Verber, brothers-in law, were Viennese Jews who emigrated from Austria and arrived in the U.S. in 1938. Both apparently joined the Communist Party of the U. S. before the American entry into the war, and both later served in the war as Army intelligence officers. At the end of the war both men obtained positions with the staff of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, and Ponger interrogated war crimes suspects and witnesses, including SS men such as Krichbaum and Wilhelm Hoettl. Later Ponger and Verber took up residence in the Soviet sector of Vienna, where they established the Central European Literary Agency as a front for espionage. The CIC placed them under surveillance for a number of years they were finally arrested in 1953. Krichbaum had a number of contacts with both men, and he refrained from describing those contacts to officials of the Gehlen organization and the CIA. A 1963 document, apparently stemming from the BND, concluded that Krichbaum too was working for the Soviets as early as 1950.
See Detailed Report.

Friedrich Panzinger: The name file on Friedrich Panzinger covers mostly events between 1956, when the former SS colonel and high Gestapo official was released from Soviet prison and came to West Germany, and 1959, when he committed suicide.

Born on February 1, 1903, Panzinger became a specialist on Communist espionage-he was for a time Kopkow's superior (see Kopkow listing above). He also served as commander of the Security Police and SD in the Baltic states in 1943, a time when inmates of concentration camps there were liquidated. At the end of the war he went into hiding, but was arrested in Linz, Austria, in 1946, and imprisoned by the Soviet Union. The Soviets released Panzinger in 1956, giving him a secret mission to penetrate the BND, where some of his former colleagues were employed. Panzinger immediately reported this mission to the West German authorities, who then used him as a double agent. Apart from trying to keep both sides satisfied, Panzinger had another difficulty-the possibility that the Bavarian government would try him for war crimes. Panzinger's intelligence superiors quietly interceded with the Bavarian Justice Ministry so that he would not be arrested, but the single officer at the Ministry who had been informed on the matter was on leave when the order for Panzinger's arrest came. He committed suicide in his cell. His motives for this act remained unclear-perhaps he was depressed by the prospect of another term in prison. But the file indicates that in the reviews of the case afterwards West German intelligence authorities could not determine with any confidence whether Panzinger had ever been loyal to the West.

Martin Sandberger: The name file on Martin Sandberger merely consists of brief notations about his wartime activity as commander of a mobile killing unit (Einsatzkommando 1a of Einsatzgruppe A) in the Baltic states. There is no indication from the file whether Sandberger, who was interrogated by his captors in 1945 and was later tried at Nuremberg in the Einsatzgruppen trial (an American proceeding), was involved in postwar intelligence work. Although sentenced to death at Nuremberg, Sandberger was given clemency and was released from prison in 1953.

Franz Six: Like Sandberger, Franz Six was a former Einsatzkommando officer convicted at Nuremberg and sentenced to twenty years in prison. Six had also for a time headed the Ideological Research branch (Amt VII) of the RSHA, writing about Jews and Freemasons as enemies of the Third Reich. Later he also held a position in the Foreign Ministry. After his early release from prison in 1952 Six was reported to have met with other former Nazi officials. In 1956 Six reportedly owned a West German publishing firm. At the time of the Eichmann trial Six's name surfaced in memos about those who SD officials who had worked (before the war) with Eichmann. Later memos in the file suggest that Six had joined the Gehlen organization sometime during the mid-1950s and was associated with a known Soviet agent. In 1963 the East German media charged that Gehlen had recently transferred a number of former SS and SD officials to camouflaged positions in order to diminish criticism that he was using war criminals. Six was named (along with Emil Augsburg and Franz Goering-see above listings).

Hans Sommer: The small name file on Hans Sommer, a Gestapo official in Norway and France, indicates that after 1945 Sommer became involved in intelligence work in Spain for a government whose identity is redacted, but in the opinion of the historians was probably France. At the beginning of 1950 the Gehlen organization recruited him for use in counterespionage: at first his reports were judged useful. In 1953 he was dropped from the Gehlen organization for faulty reporting.

Guido Zimmer: The name file on Guido Zimmer reveals many German intelligence activities in northern Italy toward the end of World War II. A key document is an annotated translation of Zimmer's notebooks, the original written in German shorthand, covering events from May 1944 until March 1945. These notebooks and the file generally contain new information about the early surrender of German forces in northern Italy. Allen Dulles's coup in arranging a German surrender on May 2, 1945, to which he gave the code name Operation Sunrise, added luster to his accomplishments as head of OSS in Switzerland: this story was revealed in 1947 magazine articles (in the Saturday Evening Post). Although the purpose of such publicity was probably to counteract tendentious and inaccurate Italian accounts of the surrender of German forces in Italy (see discussion above under Dollmann), stories about Dulles's wartime successes helped him later to become director of the CIA. Therefore, new evidence about the background to Operation Sunrise is historically quite significant.

Guido Zimmer, born in 1911, joined the SS and SD in 1936 and the Foreign Intelligence branch of the RSHA in 1940. After the Allied invasion of Italy in September 1943, Germany rushed troops and SS and police into Italy and took control of most of the country: then killings and deportations of Jews began. Zimmer was assigned to Genoa, where he tracked Jews down, then to Milan, where his team, under the command of the infamous SS Colonel Walter Rauff, (who had earlier helped design gassing vans to poison Jews and other victims) seized Jewish property. Zimmer obtained political information from abroad and built up of a network of agents who could supply Germany with intelligence if the Allies overran Italy. Like Rauff, Zimmer was involved both with war crimes and with espionage in Italy.

In November 1944 Zimmer suggested contacting Allied intelligence in Switzerland through an Italian industrialist known to him, Baron Luigi Parrilli. Rauff and other SD officials approved the German approach. High SD authorities in Berlin also concurred. After some logistical delays and the naming of the mission as "Operation Wool," Parrilli, who also had ties to the Italian partisans fighting against German occupation, went to Switzerland in mid-February 1945. His mission was to convince the Western Allies of the need to prevent the complete destruction of Germany and northern Italy, which would leave much of Europe open to the Soviet Union. Parrilli's discussions with OSS officials prepared the way for March-April visits to Switzerland by Zimmer, Dollmann, Harster, and above all, Karl Wolff, Himmler's one-time deputy and at this time Highest SS and Police Leader for Italy.

All these SS officials had very personal stakes in earning American goodwill before the end of the war-they were all severely implicated in the Holocaust, the theft of Jewish property, and the seizure of Italian property as well. They could not simply surrender to Dulles, because German army Field Marshal Albert Kesselring and General Heinrich Vietinghoff controlled the German military in northern Italy. After many delays and much confusion, however, an arrangement between Dulles and Wolff took effect on May 2: the German military surrender in northern Italy preceded the overall end of the war in Europe by five days.

Dulles got some of the public relations benefits of Operation Sunrise. But, as an SSU official noted in a memo written in 1946, based on the evidence in Zimmer's classified file, Operation Sunrise was at least as much Operation Wool-that is, a German initiative.

Operation Wool also gave Zimmer direct personal benefits after the war. Zimmer became Parrilli's secretary and applied for Italian citizenship. Dulles intervened to try to protect him against prosecution, on the grounds that he had served American interests. Memos in the file suggest that Army officials and also James Angleton of OSS (and later CIA) were unhappy about favorable American treatment of Zimmer, but they at best managed to neutralize those who wanted to do something positive for him. Zimmer contacted Gehlen in December 1948, and he developed ties with former SS officers in 1950. The file does not clarify how deep his involvement in postwar German intelligence activity was.
See Detailed Report.


A History of The John Deere Model A General Purpose Tractor

The John Deere Model A Tractor was the first true row-crop tractor and is one of the most beloved tractors in John Deere’s 175 year history. Manufactured in April of 1934, the first Model A came equipped with an impressive 25 horsepower engine and a 4-speed transmission.

The John Deere Model A Tractor was the first tractor that had adjustable wheel treads, which gave it a wider range of utility and adaptability than other models on the market at that time. Having the ability to change the space between rear wheels gave the operator more control, ultimately making it easier to steer the tractor.

Prior to 1938, the Model A featured an open fan shaft, a defining characteristic often sought out by John Deere collectors today. During the 1938–1939 time period, Deere & Company closed the fan shaft to give the tractor a more streamlined look.

The year 1940 marked the beginning of two changes meant to improve the functionality of the John Deere Model A. During this time, the size of the engine was increased from 309 cubic inches to 321 cubic inches in an effort to make it more powerful. One year later, in 1941, the Model A boasted a new transmission, and it went from four forward speeds to six.

The “slant dash” Model A tractor was produced between 1939 and 1947, and it featured an electric start option in which a special hood piece was used to cover the battery. By 1947, the battery was moved under the seat.

In 1952, the production of the John Deere Model A finally came to an end, marking an impressive nearly 20-year manufacturing lifetime. The John Deere Model A Tractor was a revolutionary tractor, spawning an entire line of two-cylinder tractors that included the B, G, L, LA, H, and M. Today, these tractors are collected rather than used, which is a credit to not only their reliability at the time they were used but also to how they are still revered by John Deere collectors and enthusiasts.

Interested in learning more about the history of John Deere tractors? Check out this blog post!

If you have any questions about various tractor models, you can contact your local John Deere dealer.

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After overhaul at San Francisco and training at San Diego and Pearl Harbor, Deede joined the replenishment group for the 3rd Fleet at Ulithi on 21 July, operating with this group during the final air raids and bombardments on the Japanese mainland. She served as communications linking ship between hospital ships Benevolence  (AH-13) and Tranquility  (AH-14) from 16 to 21 August, then rejoined the logistics group to enter Tokyo Bay on 2 October. Four days later she got underway for Pearl Harbor where she served with the Hawaiian Sea Frontier from 17 October to 19 November.

Deede arrived at San Francisco on 25 November, was decommissioned there on 9 January 1946, and sold on 12 June 1947.


Watch the video: Dee Dee - Medley Live @ Holiday Party